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EDITORIAL

It is with great pleasure that I am introducing you to this winter's ESTRO edition and to the first issue of the new academic year. The sixth volume of the university's academic student journal is successfully continuing a five-year tradition by publishing student research papers of the highest standard, from a multitude of disciplines that are taught at Essex. The articles chosen for this instalment are sure to challenge your critical thought by proposing new and intriguing perspectives upon a varied range of topics. This intellectual odyssey starts with an incursion into the depths of the human psyche, illustrated in a Freudian analysis of *The Hunger Games*. Although it treats matters of the law, the next article gives you the opportunity to view an aspect of language which helps us create our own mental construction of reality. It focuses on the arbitrariness of concepts such as criminal labels that are subjected to social and historical changes and are rendered ineffective.

The projection of the mind into the external world helps explain how our consciousness perceives what happens around us. The following two essays offer a transition from thought to action by giving a comprehensive description and raising awareness of how theoretical concepts interact with historical events. One discusses the implications of ethnicity and certain ideologies that can lead to atrocious events, leaning on the evidence of the controversial subject of the Armenian Genocide. The other skilfully navigates between bi-polar and multi-polar systems trying to establish the strengths and weaknesses of each of these two political power notions. This engaging reading experience will come full circle with the final essay, which proposes a very interesting take on the rise of minor parties in the British general elections since 1997. The author succeeds in elaborating an insightful analysis of the post-1997 data that will allow readers to consider certain relevant elements responsible for the shifts in voting mentality that occur behind the British political scene.

Opening the issue is a compelling article by Frazer Meritt, whose analytical writing describes the journey to psychosexual maturity of one of the best-known characters in current popular film culture. In 'Freud, the Oedipus Complex, and *The Hunger Games*', the author starts by a general presentation of the Oedipus complex, key element related to the human psyche that leads to the formation of the unconscious. Meritt will then introduce its readers to the particular way in which this natural process applies to Katniss Everdeen, the main protagonist of this cinematic production. Her evolution is hindered

by the totalitarian regime under which she and her family are living and by the death of her father that occurs before she manages to complete all five stages of the phenomenon named by Freud. The character's actions are presented as being under the influence of a reversed Oedipal complex. The construction of the unconscious is therefore experienced by Katniss in a unique and enticing way that will make you reconsider your own knowledge about the human psyche.

The next submission treats the topic of criminal labelling and how concepts designed by the human mind can change according to social progress and alteration of the law. Supported by a selection of examples and written in a clear and distinct way, even for those unfamiliar to the subject, 'Corporate Crime and White Collar Crime: Inaccuracies of Criminal Labels' is a well-researched article by Roy Clark who explores the evolution in time and their currency within the legal term system of 'corporate crime' and 'white collar crime'. Clark argues that the confusion caused by the use of these two terms is created by a misunderstanding of the English criminal law, especially by non-specialised individuals who wrongfully perceive this terminology as corresponding to only a partial record of cases. In his extensive analysis of legal jargon, the author proposes two new labels that would offer a more accurate description of these specific situations, 'organisational crime' and 'occupational crime' respectively.

Sofya Manukyan continues the series of submissions with her article about 'The Interconnection between Ethnicity, Ideology and Genocide and their Reflection on the Armenian Genocide'. The author manages to change the viewpoint on this highly debated political matter by expanding her research to the theoretical component standing behind this historical event. Manukyan first introduces terms such as ethnicity and nationalism which she gradually shows to be the ideological instigators of a series of forced processes of assimilation that started with the Armenian genocide. The writer follows with a thorough report of the events that will allow readers to improve their understanding of the factors linked to the genocide, of the people involved in taking this particular type of action and of how the process was undergone throughout history, from the time of the Ottoman Empire to that of the Republic of Turkey.

The national perspective on political systems and their functions is widened to a global one with an essay written by Eleftherios Eleftheriou. In 'Is Bi-Polarity more stable than Multi-Polarity?', Eleftheriou reviews several political systems throughout history in order to establish a pattern of stability hanging in balance between bi-polar and multi-polar systems. The author uses the Cold War period to illustrate the political structure governed by the two main powers of that age, the USA and the USSR. At the same time,

he distinguishes between past multi-polar systems that have caused the two World Wars for example, and the current situation in international relations splitting political analysts who argue either for a modern world ruled by one main political force, the USA, or for a multi-polar global power force. While his essay brings compelling arguments for both situations, his conclusion favours bi-polarity, the proven characteristic of a more stable political sphere.

The fifth and final article of this edition of ESTRO is signed by James Downes, whose attempt to answer the following question is supported by the United Kingdom Elections data from 1997 to 2010: 'What explains the rise of Minor Parties in British General Elections since 1997?'. After giving a comprehensive explanation of what minor parties in the United Kingdom represent and quoting the percentages of voters choosing minor parties like UKIP, the BNP and the Green Party and major parties such as the Conservative, the Labour and the Liberal Democrat parties, Downes outlines two different models that could influence the shift in votes throughout the period mentioned above. The first one states that non-political issues like environmentalism and social structure variations could be responsible for the success of minor parties in the United Kingdom. On the other hand, the second model argues that an increasing negative perception of mainstream parties has been accountable for a change in preference in what voters are concerned. The author addresses, however, another issue regarding minor parties in the second segment of his paper, by putting an emphasis on the limitations of their post-1997 success, hindered by factors of a varied nature.

I hope you all enjoy reading and experiencing the fresh and challenging perspectives offered by this issue of the journal as much as I enjoyed editing and making connections between the pieces of the puzzle. Comprising of topics that might be both familiar and unfamiliar to you, I trust that this edition will help you broaden your academic horizons as much as it did me and will inspire you to expand the investigation of your own area of specialisation and devote your work to this ongoing process of academic research.

On a final note, I would like to thank everyone who contributed to the final form of this issue, especially authors and reviewers, for their fruitful work and dedication. ESTRO is and will remain a journal run by students, for students, and its team will always welcome any new and stimulating submissions that will help maintain the journal's high standard tradition reflected within the academic environment at the University of Essex.

Amalia Mihailescu, Editor

Freud, the Oedipus Complex, and The Hunger Games

Frazer Merritt

ABSTRACT

Sigmund Freud asserted that art was the result of the Oedipus complex, a psychological conflict that is found in the psyches of all people, in any era. The Oedipus complex theory asserts that a boy or girl falls in love with the parent of the opposite sex and desires to kill the same-sex parent in order to replace them. Upon realizing this is unrealistic, the child buries these feelings and this first repression initiates the formation of the unconscious.

All fictional stories, according to Freud, are the release of this unconscious Oedipal struggle via symbols. *The Hunger Games*, too, can be interpreted using the Freudian method. Katniss must confront the Capitol—the Superego—and its violent forces—the Id—in order to realize that she is guilty of desiring to kill a parent. By coming to terms with this psychic crime, she frees her neurotic ego and libido so that she can begin to love the opposite sex.

The audience/reader, by identification, undergoes the same psychological process as Katniss. *The Hunger Games*, like all good fiction, helps people, and society at large, address their core unconscious dilemma.

Before Freud's brilliant insights into the workings of the human mind at the end of the 19th century, artists had fragmentary understandings of mental processes, but they lacked a method to elucidate art's deeper meaning (Strachey, 1990). This changed forever with the creation of psychoanalysis. Freud introduced the concept of the unconscious—with its repressed content and desires, its dreams and erotic fantasies—and by mapping how it functioned, he provided the first 'tool', one could say, for a scientific examination of our thoughts and behaviour, and, by extension, our creative endeavours (Strachey, 1990). In seminal texts in which Freud deconstructs literature—*Interpretation of Dreams*, *Some Character-Types Met With in Psychoanalytic Work*, and *Dostoevsky and Parricide*—he applies his theories to the works of Sophocles, Shakespeare, Ibsen, and Dostoyevsky, thereby demonstrating that certain motifs, particularly that of the Oedipus complex, are universal. By using fiction as evidence that the psyche is structured in the same way and concerned with the same psychological dilemmas, across a time span of 2,500 years in a diversity of different cultures, we can follow Freud's lead and use his ideas in relation to

contemporary works. For this essay, we shall explore one of the most internationally popular movies of the moment, *The Hunger Games* (Ross, 2012), in order to prove that psychological themes are bound to repeat themselves in artworks and the reason they do so is to aid in our own mental health and development.

Freud famously asserted that “the beginnings of religion, ethics, society, and art meet in the Oedipus complex” (Freud, 1913, pp. 156-7). He believed this because in the course of any person’s psychosexual development, they undergo five stages and the Oedipus complex plays a crucial role in the formation of the unconscious. First, there is the oral stage in which the infant is dominated by the pleasure principle and libido is focused on the mouth and sucking; then there is the anal stage during which the child learns bowel control and becomes fascinated by this function; afterwards, between the ages of three and five, begins the phallic stage (sometimes referred to as the Oedipal phase) (Milton et al., 2011). Here, the child becomes increasingly aware of their genitals and the strong sensations they evoke. Additionally, they become more aware of their bodies in general and the bodies of others, and this curiosity leads them to realize the anatomical differences between the genders. Central to this comprehension for both boys and girls is the phallus, which proves instrumental in forming a healthy, or unhealthy, relationship with their parents, and, ultimately, a ‘normal’ psyche, free from neuroses.

When boys experience these burgeoning sexual feelings, they direct their libidinal energies towards their mothers to form an attachment of the anaclitic type, characterized by a strong emotional and physical bond with her. Simultaneously, the boy recognizes his father as the model after whom he should emulate. For a time, these two conceptions exist without any problems (Freud, 1921). However, this changes when the child ‘falls in love’, so to speak, with the mother “who has cast a spell over us through her care and loving and all the touching, wiping, stroking, and hugging this entails” (Alsop et al., 2002, p. 42). He fantasizes being her lover, possessing her for himself, and destroying, if not killing, anyone who stands in the way of fulfilling this desire—and that includes the father. (It is this fratricidal and incestuous urge where the Oedipal complex obtains its name, for Oedipus in *Oedipus Rex* commits both of these actions.) Yet the boy comes to realize, through the reality principle, that his father is physically bigger and stronger than him, and that he could be punished with castration, a latent fear boys ostensibly develop when they see girls naked (Milton et al., 2011). This emotional crisis leads the psyche to divide itself, as the love for the mother and the murderous impulses against the father are repressed, and it is this *very first* repression that precipitates the formation of the unconscious (Alsop et al., 2002).

For girls, the situation is more complicated as they undergo their own Oedipus complex (although Jung coined the term ‘Electra complex’ and this is used by Neo-Freudians, Freud objected to this terminology, so for this essay we shall use the original phrase). They, like boys, become passionately in love with their mothers and discover the sexual differences between the genders; however, unlike boys, they react by believing themselves as ‘lacking’ and as being second-rate (Alsop et al., 2002). Hostility is directed toward the mother because the girl imagines that the mother feels this great inferiority—the female version of castration anxiety, known as ‘penis envy’—and that the mother wants to spend time with the father, rather than with the daughter (Alsop et al., 2002). In other words, the girl believes her mother does not love her because of her defective body. It is penis envy, therefore, that compels the child to reject her femininity and forsake homosexual affection for her mother, which then allows her to cross over to heterosexual love for her father, and, eventually, other men (Alsop et al., 2002). She fantasizes replacing her mother and having a baby with her father. Nonetheless, this fantasy is eventually realized as unrealistic, and may also lead to the loss of the mother’s life-sustaining love, so it is abandoned and repressed (Alsop et al., 2002).

Freud contends that at the foundation of our unconscious, for all people, lies in the Oedipal complex, upon which our entire psychical structure is built. He viewed the unconscious as seething with repressed impulses and these instincts are contained there because our ego finds them repulsive, if not threatening. As a defensive measure so that it does not become overwhelmed, the ego has buried memories linked to the Oedipal conflict—the worst of repressed material—as far away from consciousness as possible. This results in a divided person, strangers to themselves, divorced from their past of abhorrent desires. Despite the ego’s efforts, the unconscious manages to slip this forbidden content into consciousness via distortions and concealment so it is not recognized—this is done to achieve equilibrium between the ego and the unconscious, and, hopefully, to maintain or improve our psychic well-being.

This is evidenced in dreams and daydreams, and, in particular, literature. Stories, Freud thought, emanate from the unconscious, and by the use of symbols, the unconscious is able to evade the author’s detection and project itself into the outer world. Symbols in literature are actually *symptoms* of suppressed emotion from the Oedipal conflict being released. Because the parricidal and incestuous impulse is ubiquitous, it acts as a force that underlies the surface of culture, inevitably erupting in artistic productions (Figlio, 2013). Freud claimed that the play *Oedipus Rex* derives its gripping allure from “[seizing] upon a compulsion which everyone recognizes because he senses its existence within himself. Everyone was once a budding Oedipus in fantasy and recoils in horror from the dream

fulfilment here transplanted into reality” (Freud, 1897, p. 272). By extension, what makes any story powerful is when it successfully taps into atavistic sources and expresses the foundational Oedipal layers of the unconscious. When unearthing the meaning of stories, “the deepest point at which one can arrive (...) is a point at which one arrives at some sexual wish” (Nussbaum, 1994, p. 50).

Works of art, therefore, are not some external object to which we apply psychoanalysis; rather, they themselves are constitutive of psychological knowledge and are of great value to understand how the psyche operates (Nussbaum, 1994). But what can we possibly deduce from *The Hunger Games*, a Sci-Fi film that has an outlandish plot and is set in an absurdly dystopian future? It takes place in the country of Panem, which consists of twelve districts whose purpose is to serve the needs of the ruling city known as the Capitol. Every year, one boy and one girl from each district are sent to the Capitol where they partake in the Hunger Games, a televised event in which the participants fight to the death until only one remains. The story follows Katniss Everdeen, a sixteen-year-old girl, and the violent battles she endures. At first glance, there appears little correlation to the psyche and its workings.

The film begins with the character known as the Gamemaker talking on a TV show in the Capitol about the importance of the Games, which are now in their 74th year:

I think it's our tradition that comes out of a particularly painful part of our history, but it's been a way that we've been able to heal. At first it was a reminder of the Rebellion and the price the districts had to pay... It's something that knits us all together (*The Hunger Games*, 2012).

The Games were set up, as outlined in the Treaty of the Treason, as penance for the uprising by the lower-class citizens. Given the historical development of the districts and their lack of power in comparison to the Capitol, given their outlying geographical location, we can assert that the districts are symbolic of the realm of the ego and the Capitol is the realm of the unconscious. The Gamemaker's brief description almost seems to be a metaphor of the Oedipal conflict that occurs in the phallic stage: a losing struggle against more powerful forces, a separation between the ego and the unconscious, the formation of the super-ego. According to Freud, once the boy and girl recognize that it is impossible to fulfil their Oedipal desires, they identify with the same-sex parent and introject them as an internal figure in the psyche, known as the 'super-ego'. Freud thought of the super-ego as a “garrison in a conquered city” (Freud, 1930, p. 124) whose primary role was to keep the conquered population under control: in this case, the child's

desire for the parent of the opposite sex. This invading army imagery that Freud uses ties in perfectly with the Capitol being the symbol of the super-ego.

In the proceeding scenes, we observe Katniss as she navigates the small, confined world of District 12. It is a town composed of dilapidated shanties with no electricity, meagre livestock, and abject poverty. It is economically depressed, sustained by a bartering system, and its inhabitants wear simple clothing reminiscent of the Great Depression era. Nearly all of its spirit and vitality has been crushed due to the overpowering force of the Capitol. When Katniss crosses over the fence that encircles the town, she enters the forest in order to hunt for deer—symbolic of ‘being in the hunt’ for a sexual partner, a motif that has long been used in literary works, e.g. *Sir Gawain and the Green Knight*—but she is disrupted by the Capitol’s ironically titled “Peacekeepers”. From a symbolic standpoint, the ego is in a neurotic state of melancholy and its libido is dammed up.

When the Peacekeepers arrive and select Prim as their Tribute for the Games, Katniss volunteers herself in her sister’s place. It is almost as if Katniss is punishing herself for a crime. Surprisingly, she does not cry or complain, and seems to accept the circumstance as if it were fate, as if she deserves it. This ostensibly indicates an underlying sense of unconscious guilt, and by examining her familial background, we can expose why this may be so. Katniss practically acts as the matriarch of the family: she comforts Prim when she is under duress, she is in charge of obtaining food and material goods, and she reprimands her mother for being weak when her father died. It is as if Katniss is living out the fantasy of what is known as the ‘inverse’ Oedipal complex (Neu, 1991). That is to say, rather than lusting after her father and wanting to murder her mother, she instead longed for her mother and wanted to murder her father, the opposite of a traditional Oedipus complex. Because her father died in a mining accident when Katniss was young, she grew up without a male figure in the household and never properly dealt with the ‘penis envy’ phase of the Oedipal conflict. She therefore never transformed her homosexual longings for her mother into heterosexual longings for her father. As such, Katniss developed a ‘mother-fixation’ and is now revisiting her unresolved Oedipus complex during puberty, or the fifth stage in psychosexual development, the genital stage. It is this failure to deal with the Oedipus complex when she was younger that is now the cause for her melancholia and possible confusion of her sexual identity.

In the Games, Katniss and the other Tribute from her district, Peeta, battle against the teenagers from the other eleven districts. The Games are an unrelenting spectacle of violence and bloodshed; however, Katniss and Peeta only fight out of self-defense and are never the ones to attack. This couple essentially represents the manifested forces of Eros,

that of love, while the other Tributes are the embodiments of the forces of aggression. This combination is what comprises the Id. In siding with Eros, Katniss slowly, yet progressively, gains mastery over the aggressive aspects of the Id, and in doing so, cements her feminine identity that had formerly been lacking.

During the Games, Katniss comes to know herself more in a process of individuation by exploring the contents of her unconscious. At one point, Katniss is stung by genetically engineered wasps, known as 'tracker jackers', and this instigates a hallucination about her parents. We see her father venture into the mine, it exploding, and then Katniss yelling at her mother to stop being so weak. Here Katniss' Oedipal wishes are exposed: she secretly wanted her father to die in order that she could take his place and 'marry' her mother. By exposing this longing and bringing it to consciousness, it diminishes its power and Katniss can begin to bring a resolution to the inner conflict. This scene is a turning point in the storyline, and afterwards Katniss begins to express the first inklings of sexual desire for Peeta, as demonstrated by the kiss in the cave and her self-sacrificing efforts to save his life when he was injured. Finally, Katniss is ready to direct her libido away from the image of her mother and thereby overcome her mother-fixation and the melancholia it entails; finally, she is ready to direct her libido toward the opposite sex. At the culmination of the film, Katniss strikes a blow to the overbearing super-ego by making the ultimate gesture of Eros: she offers up her life by choosing to eat the poisonous berries rather than kill Peeta. The Gamemaker stops the pair from committing suicide and they are crowned Victors, allowed to return home to District 12 in peace, a new balance attained between the Capitol and the districts, the Super-ego and the ego.

By watching Katniss come to terms with her Oedipus complex, the audience also undergoes the same psychological journey that Katniss undergoes, via a process of identification. The audience is immersed in the drama and experiences, the same psychological obstacles and achievements, to a partial degree. As such, *The Hunger Games*, like all art, offers a safe way to explore these deep unconscious dilemmas because the viewer does not have to experience the brutal tasks that Katniss suffered first-hand, that is to say, the audience does not have to experience it in 'real life'. The film provides people with a way of discharging their unconscious emotions, and without such an outlet, people would be forced to vent their Oedipal guilt and aggression in unruly ways, ways that may cause injury to themselves or society. Although *The Hunger Games* (and all other popular films and novels for that matter) appears to be simple entertainment filled with explosions and action, it actually serves an important function: it helps regulate the Oedipal urges of the psyche, and in doing so, helps regulate and maintain the health of our culture and society at large.

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Corporate Crime and White Collar Crime: Inaccuracies of Criminal Labels

Roy Clark

ABSTRACT

In all areas of life, labels are used to describe groups of people, animals, objects or concepts that are in some way linked or related to each other. For example, people may be described as black or white or as European or Asian. Animals may be described as mammals, reptiles, fish or birds. Edible plants may be described as vegetables or as fruit. The same can be applied to criminal law where convenient labels are used to group together linked or related concepts: violent crimes, sexual offences and property offences. Two such labels are 'corporate crime' and 'white collar crime'. In this essay, the author seeks to show, by the use of a number of examples, that the terms 'corporate crime' and 'white collar crime' are no longer appropriate due to changes to both the law and the society in which the law operates. These changes have rendered the original meaning of these labels outdated. The author suggests that new labels, such as 'organisational crime' and 'occupational crime', are to be preferred.

'Corporate crime' is generally regarded as any crime committed by a corporation or other form of business unit or by persons acting on behalf of such an organisation. It is usually associated with crimes motivated by the wish to maximise profits or otherwise further the business's aims or interests. The term 'white-collar crime' was first used by the American sociologist Edwin H. Sutherland in a 1939 speech entitled "The White-Collar Criminal" to a joint meeting of the American Sociological Society and the American Economic Association. He defined it as "a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation". Sutherland, no doubt, had in mind wealthy businessmen embezzling or bribing their way to greater personal wealth. This essay seeks to demonstrate that these terms are both now misnomers and no longer appropriate. They serve only to set such activities aside from the 'real' crimes of ordinary people in a way that suggests that they are somehow less culpable. This essay will suggest that if such categorisation is required at all, the terms 'organisational crime' and 'occupational crime' are now more apposite.

‘Corporate’ means: “forming a corporation; incorporated; of a corporation or corporations: corporate finance; of or belonging to a united group; joint” (Sinclair, 2003, p. 330). In every day parlance, it means ‘big business’. The term ‘corporate crime’, at least in the mind of a non-lawyer, implies large-scale criminal offences committed by big businesses - national or multi-national conglomerates - abusing their power and wealth to commit crimes across the globe. It gives the impression that there is a distinct body of law to regulate such conduct. The English criminal law, however, applies equally (in theory at least – see below) to all legal persons (Interpretation Act 1978, Section 5 and schedule 1). There is no separate section of the English criminal law dedicated to such corporations but inapplicable to small and medium enterprises, like the one-man-band or the corner shop. The terminology also ignores the fact that the English criminal law applies to businesses whose *raison d’être* is to make a profit, as well as to non-profit organisations (for example, trade unions or associations), public authorities, public services (for example, National Health Service, police or fire department), non-governmental organisations and charities. The expression ‘corporate crime’ is therefore erroneous, both in terms of the implied dimensions of the enterprise concerned and in terms of the range of activities which might fall within its scope. The author considers that the expression ‘organisational crime’ can be argued to be more appropriate and will attempt to demonstrate this by a brief analysis of the (English) law relating to corporate homicide.

It can be noted that, despite using the word ‘corporate’ in its title, the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 uses the word ‘organisation’ in defining the actual offence. Section 1(1) of the Act states: “An organisation to which this section applies is guilty of an offence if the way in which its activities are managed or organised (a) causes a person’s death, and (b) amounts to a gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation to the deceased”.

Organisations to which the Act applies include (a) a corporation; (b) a department or other body listed in Schedule 1; (c) a police force; and (d) a partnership, or a trade union or employers’ association that is an employer (Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, section 1(2)). Schedule 1 of the Act lists 48 government departments and agencies. These include such diverse bodies as the Assets Recovery Agency, the Cabinet Office, the Forestry Commission, Ordnance Survey, and the Serious Fraud Office. This clearly illustrates the fact that ‘corporate manslaughter’ is not limited to the criminal actions of corporations as traditionally understood as set out above. In fact, the first ever conviction under this Act was of a company employing only eight people at the time of the offence (*R v Cotswold Geotechnical (Holdings) Ltd.*, Winchester Crown Court, 16

February 2011 (currently unreported)). The victim had died when a trench in which he was collecting geological samples collapsed.

Under the Act, a ‘relevant duty of care’ includes (a) a duty owed by an organisation to its employees and persons working for or performing services for the organisation; (b) a duty owed as occupier of premises; (c) a duty owed in connection with (i) the supply by the organisation of goods or services; (ii) the carrying on by the organisation of any construction or maintenance operations; (iii) the carrying on by the organisation of any other activity on a commercial basis; or (iv) the use or keeping by the organisation of any plant, vehicle or other thing (Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, section 2(1)). The Ministry of Justice suggests in *A guide to the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007* (p. 6) that the offence:

will apply where a charity or voluntary organisation has been incorporated (for example, as a company or as a charitable incorporated organisation under the Charities Act 2006). A charity or voluntary organisation that operates as any other form of organisation to which the offence applies, such as a partnership with employees, will also be liable to the new offence.

It can therefore be seen that the scope of the Act is very much broader than the dictionary definition of a corporation. Furthermore, section 20 of the Act abolishes the common law offence of manslaughter by gross negligence “in its application to corporations and in any application it has to other organisations to which section 1 applies”. It appears, therefore, that the common law offence of corporate manslaughter still applies to all other organisations not falling within the definition found in section 1 of the Act.

The well-recognised legal problem of applying the common law offence of corporate manslaughter to organisations is the same problem which afflicts the application of other criminal offences requiring proof of *mens rea* to organisations: the so-called ‘identification principle’. As Denning LJ said in *H.L. Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v T.J. Graham & Sons Ltd* [1957] 1 QB 159:

A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a brain and nerve centre which controls what it does ... directors and managers who represent the directing mind and will of the company, and control what it does. The state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of the company and is treated by the law as such.

Bingham LJ, in *R v H.M. Coroner for East Kent ex parte Spooner & Others* (1989) 88 Cr. App. R. 10, said that in order to convict an organisation: “it is required that the *mens rea* and the *actus reus* of [the offence] should be established not against those who acted for or in the name of the company but against those who were to be identified as the embodiment of the company itself”.

It is not enough to aggregate evidence against a number of individuals at different levels within the organisation (even if some of them are senior management) in order to build a case against the organisation. It is for this reason that large organisations are very often not prosecuted or are not convicted of criminal offences in situations where smaller organisations would be. In a large national or multi-national company it is very often impossible to apply the identification principle meaning that such companies escape prosecution. Compare, for example, the case of *R v P & O Ferries (Dover) Ltd* (1991) 93 Cr. App. R. 72 with the case of *R v O.L.L. Limited* [1994] (unreported). In the former case, related to the sinking of the Herald of Free Enterprise car ferry that resulted in the loss of 193 lives, the company escaped conviction. In the latter case, related to the loss of four lives in a canoeing incident, the company consisting of only four members of staff was convicted.

Organisations may be held liable to be convicted of strict liability offences (offences requiring no *mens rea* or ‘guilty mind’) through the doctrine of vicarious liability. In simple terms, this doctrine imposes criminal liability on an employer for acts done by an employee in the course of his or her employment. However, such strict liability offences usually concern regulatory rather than truly criminal matters. An often quoted example is section 59(1) of the Licensing Act 1964. Where the offence is not one of strict liability, the organisation may still be convicted under the delegation principle (see Lord Goddard CJ in *Linnett v Metropolitan Police Commissioner* [1946] KB 290, p. 294). Under this principle, the *mens rea* (‘guilty mind’) of the employee or agent is imputed to the employer in circumstances where the employer’s authority has been delegated to the employee or agent, provided only that the *actus reus* of the employee was within the scope of his authority (see for example *Allen v Whitehead* [1930] 1 KB 211). The courts, however, will not normally entertain charges against an organisation where “no effective order by way of sentence can be made” (per Stable J in *R v ICR Haulage Ltd* [1944] KB 551, p. 554), for example where imprisonment is the only sanction available.

Having dealt with the expression ‘corporate crime’, it is now necessary to analyse the term ‘white collar crime’ in the same way in order to demonstrate that it, too, is out of place in the modern world. The dictionary definition of ‘white-collar’ is “of or designating non-manual and usually salaried workers employed in professional and clerical occupations” (Sinclair, 2003, p. 1723). To a non-lawyer, the term ‘white-collar crime’

conjugates up the image of the accountant falsifying the company books or a C.E.O. siphoning off profits for their own purposes. Again, it gives the impression that there is a distinct body of law to regulate such conduct. Again, there is not. The ordinary English criminal law applies to these so-called white-collar criminals in the same way it applies to the rest of the population.

It is submitted that ‘occupational crime’ could provide a more appropriate description of the type of activity encapsulated by Sutherland’s out-of-date phrase but even this might suggest to any non-specialised person that it refers to crimes committed in the course of paid employment. No doubt this is what Sutherland intended when he spoke in 1939 of “crime in relation to business” committed by “respectable or at least respected business and professional men” (Sutherland E. H., 1940, p. 81). However, it ignores identical crimes committed by persons who give their time voluntarily. As will be shown below, some of the types of criminality considered to be within the scope of ‘white-collar crime’ are often committed by persons not in paid employment, but in positions of trust in the voluntary sector. It is submitted that these deserve inclusion within this category of crime. A better title which encompasses both the paid and the unpaid spheres may be assigned as ‘breach of trust crimes’ because this type of offending inevitably involves a “violation of delegated or implied trust” (Sutherland E. H., 1940, p. 81). Perhaps ‘breach of trust crime’ lacks impact and is a little long-winded. The author contends, therefore, that ‘occupational crime’ is a more viable title so long as it is understood to include crimes committed during voluntary work in addition to crimes committed during paid employment.

Encapsulated within the term ‘white-collar (or occupational) crime’ are offences of *inter alia*, theft, fraud, conspiracy to defraud, false accounting, money laundering, bribery and insider dealing. According to Gobert and Punch (2007) these crimes:

are usually committed for the organisation, the prototypical [sic] situation which Sutherland envisaged, they may also be committed against the organisation. Or the organisation may simply be the vehicle for achieving personal goals and exercising power.

Hence, the link between organisational crime (corporate crime) and occupational crime (white collar crime) is that the latter is typically committed by persons: “who have risen sufficiently within the [organisational] hierarchy to be in a position to exploit the unique opportunities provided by their senior level management posts” (Clinard & Yeager, 1980, quoted in Gobert and Punch, 2007, p. 3). In other words, the crime is made possible by

the person's position within the organisation, often facilitated by a failure of management, supervision and control within the organisation either as a result of incompetence or wilful blindness, and sometimes further aided by failures by external regulatory bodies. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the fraudulent trading activities of Nick Leeson. The Conclusion of the Report of the Board of Banking Supervision Inquiry into the Circumstances of the Collapse of Barings Bank 18 July 1995 said:

13.11 We consider that those with direct executive responsibility for establishing effective controls must bear much of the blame...

13.13 The fact that Leeson was permitted throughout to remain in charge of both front office and back office at BFS was a most serious failing...

13.16 Leeson was not properly supervised.

In the case of Nick Leeson, the losses ran to over £800 million. There was a similar fraud by Jérôme Kerviel, an options trader at the French bank Société Générale with losses estimated at £3.7 billion. On 2nd March 2011, Catherine Kissick, who had been a senior vice president at Colonial Bank, Alabama, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud, wire fraud and securities fraud which led to losses of almost US\$1 billion and the collapse of that bank in 2009.

It should not be assumed that all occupational crimes are of this magnitude. For example, on 19th July 2006, at Warwick Crown Court, Leslie Pattison (an estate agent) and Philip Griffiths (a solicitor) were sentenced to 3 years imprisonment and 18 months imprisonment respectively for money laundering offences. Pattison had knowingly purchased a house belonging to convicted drug traffickers for one third of its true market value. Griffiths carried out the conveyancing work. Pattison had acquired criminal property (Section 329 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002) and had failed to disclose a suspicious transaction (Section 330 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002) while Griffiths had also failed to disclose a suspicious transaction (Section 330 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002). On 7th April 2008, Thomas McGoldrick (a solicitor) was sentenced at Manchester Crown Court to 10 years imprisonment for defrauding a disabled client of £1.2 million of his compensation for injuries received in a road accident. On 7th January 2011, David Chaytor (a former Member of Parliament) was sentenced at Southwark Crown Court to 18 months imprisonment for fraudulently claiming £18,350 in parliamentary expenses. At Snaresbrook Crown Court, on 8th February 2011, Salima Rashid (a driving instructor) and Nick Madigan (a driving test examiner) were convicted of bribery offences in relation to cash payments in exchange for pass certificates issued to learner drivers who should

otherwise have failed the driving test. What these cases serve to illustrate is that there are opportunities in almost every occupation to commit what might be considered occupational crimes. In all the cases cited, the offender was in the position to commit the offence because of their paid employment. However, as argued above, occupational crime should not be thought of as something only those in paid employment can commit. Joseph Mulcahy and Maureen Lewis founded the Dream Foundation charity, the aim of which was to grant the wishes of sick and disabled children. Over six years the charity raised about £1.2 million of which only £320,000 was spent on sick children. Mulcahy and Lewis spent the rest on themselves. At Newcastle Crown Court, on 12th December 2003, they were sentenced to 5 years imprisonment and 21 months imprisonment respectively. The National Fraud Authority estimates fraud against charities at around £1.3 billion per year, of which 47% is estimated to have been committed by an employee or a volunteer (National Fraud Authority's Annual Fraud Indicator 2011).

It could be argued that some of the above examples are not 'white-collar crime' according to Sutherland's original definition ("crime in relation to business" committed by "respectable or at least respected business and professional men") (Sutherland E. H., 1940, p. 80). After all, a driving test examiner or an estate agent is not a high-level executive in a business scenario. There is no dispute that the crime was committed as a direct result of their being employed to do a certain job. If they were not so employed, the opportunity to commit that particular offence would not have arisen. The sums of money involved may not be so large. If what they have done is not 'white-collar crime', it is necessary to consider what it is that distinguishes their crimes from those of the senior managers and professionals envisaged by Sutherland. The answer seems to be merely their station in life. They were not senior managers or professionals so they are to be regarded as common criminals. The suggestion is that 'white collar criminals' are somehow less culpable. It is submitted that this is an artificial distinction which reinforces among senior executives the idea that their crimes are not real crimes.

The above examples of occupational crime are all cases in which the offender had committed the crime *against* the organisation or had used their position within the organisation for their own purposes. The 'Guinness Affair' is an example of occupational crime committed *for* the organisation by very senior management, respected businessmen and other professionals recruited to assist in an illegal share support operation during Guinness's 'battle' with Argyle for the take-over of Distillers. Arguably, some of the defendants were acting in the best interests (or so they thought) of the company (Guinness) and its shareholders. They were, however, variously charged with and convicted of offences of theft, false accounting, conspiracy to defraud and violations of section 151 of the Companies Act 1985 (see *R v Saunders (Ernest Walter)*, *R v Parnes*

(*Anthony Keith*), *R v Ronson (Gerald Maurice)*, *R v Lyons (Isidore Jack)* No. 2 [1996] 1 Cr. App. R. 463.

In conclusion, this essay sought to demonstrate that the terms ‘corporate crime’ and ‘white-collar crime’ are both now misnomers and no longer appropriate. The terms ‘organisational crime’ and ‘occupational crime’ respectively are to be preferred provided that ‘occupational’ is understood to include both paid and unpaid work. The link between organisational crime and occupational crime has been established by showing that ‘occupational crime’ can only be committed in the work environment, whether that work is paid or unpaid. It is often committed either for the benefit of the organisation or against the organisation due to a lack of effective management, supervision and control within the organisation and, on occasion, by external regulators.

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The Interconnection between Ethnicity, Ideology and Genocide and their Reflection on the Armenian Genocide

Sofya Manukyan

ABSTRACT

The aim of this essay is to discuss the correlation of notions such as ethnicity and ideology and the usage of these notions in instigating genocides. The theoretical part of this essay will be supported by the detailed study of the 1915 events, when the Ottoman Empire initiated the targeted mass-killings of its ethnic Armenian (as well as Greek and Assyrian) minorities by systematically exterminating them from their historic homeland of what today is known as the Republic of Turkey. These atrocities are recognized as genocide by 21 countries, but not yet by Turkey itself. However, in this essay we will not concentrate on the latter aspect of non-recognition of the Genocide and the political motives behind this, but we will rather discuss the ideologies, as well as the perception of ethnic unity as a core concept in instigating these atrocities.

The Correlation of Ethnicity and Ideology in Inciting Genocides

Anthropologists define several levels of ethnicity, the highest level of which is the ethnic community, where the self-defined human population shares a myth of common ancestry, historical memories and elements of culture and a measure of solidarity. These types of communities have a clear conception of who they are and have a common ethno-history, often articulated in chronicles and epics (Smith, 2006, p. 172). This type of definition is also applied for diaspora ethnic communities such as the Armenians, Greeks, Jews, who retained a symbolic link with their ancestral homelands (Smith, 2006, p. 172).

Different factors play a role in the formation of ethnic consciousness. These include the interplay of culture and politics, a sense of common ancestry, long warfare between states, religion, certain codes of communication among populations sharing common elements of culture, as well as collective beliefs and shared attachments to landscapes, all of which contribute in their turn to the creation and preservation of national identity (Smith, 2006, p. 172). These ethnic attachments and perceptions often influence political

action, i.e. the political elites use the above-mentioned factors for reaffirmation of the territorial, cultural and other types of claims of the particular ethnic group or nation (Smith, 2006, p. 172). As Malesevic states, ethnicity and ‘nationess’ have much more to do with ideology than identity (2006, p. 157). Explaining the connection between ethnicity and ideology, he stresses that collective cultural difference is more than the synonym for ethnicity or ‘nationess’, since when formulating an identity, a choice of certain practices or artifacts is made from the nearly unlimited repertoire that cultures provide, which according to Malesevic, is politically motivated: in other words, ethnicity and ‘nationess’ are not merely culturally bound, but politically motivated forms of social action, which, in turn, shifts the perception of ethnicity and nationality based on identity into concepts substantiated by ideology (2006, p. 157).

Describing the power of ideology in mobilizing people, Malesevic quotes Cohen, who stated that ethnicity is essentially a political phenomenon and traditional customs are used only as mechanisms for political alignment (2006, p. 166). Malesevic goes on explaining that the use of cultural or religious symbols is aimed at mobilizing large sectors of the population on ethno-national basis, so that when confronted with other groups, they perceive them as culturally different and thus threatening. Elites manage to ideologically articulate cultural difference as a political difference, which in its turn gives political meaning and significance to culture by politicizing its content (2006, p. 166).

As a result, nationalism is formed, which, as described by Gellner, creates the concept that the ruler should belong to the same ethnic group as the ruled (Conversi, 2006, p. 320). The opposite situation is thus a road leading to ethnic cleansing, forced assimilation, mass deportation and genocide, because claiming that the inhabitants of a specific constituency must have the same ethnic roots of its leaders is to give green light to mass expulsion and redrawing of boundaries to suit the group’s genealogy (Conversi, 2006, p. 321). Gellner also points at ethno-political purity as a factor of nationalism, which is the symbol of most nationalist attempts to erase ethnic distinctiveness by homogenizing entire populations (Conversi, 2006, p. 321).

History has shown that the process of assimilation is made easier particularly when nationalist mobilizations are accompanied by state militarism (Conversi, 2006, p. 321). As such, the earliest occurrence of this form of assimilation was the Armenian genocide at the beginning of the 20th century, when Westernizing nationalism emerged as an influential force among the Turkish elites (Conversi, 2006, p. 321). As Conversi states, “the 1914-16 mass extermination campaigns were unprecedented by any humanly acceptable and recognizable standard”, which occurred as a result of rapidly modernizing

state structures, which in their turn, by imitating Western models, were trying to prevent the collapse of the empire (2006, p. 321).

Malesevic points out as well that ethnic cleansings have been the result of not only the birth of modern nation-states, but also of the processes of democratization, liberalization and modernization; “it was the arrival of modernity – and its most enduring creation, the Enlightenment inspired nation-state – which generated an environment for the systematic mass extermination of human beings” (Malesevic, 2006, p. 204). In such circumstances, the prevailing assumption is that achieving a new properly functioning state is only possible through a single standardized cultural idiom. When this cultural homogeneity is achieved gradually and slowly, even if it involves systematic mass scale bloodshed (which in a course of time becomes a forgotten historical episode), we accept it as something normal and natural, while when this same principle is applied suddenly in front of our eyes, without any restraints, we are shocked and disgusted by its savagery (as was the case with the Rwandan Genocide) (Malesevic, 2006, pp. 205-6).

Thus, Malesevic concludes that the reasons for ethnic cleansing and genocide are not so much in the authoritarian tradition or politics, or in the economic or technological backwardness, but in the idea of creating a modern nation-state, which eventually lays the foundation for all genocides (2006, p. 206).

In terms of analyzing the motives of systematic mass killing, Mann (2005) shows as well that the role of the state and the ‘process of democratization’ play a big role in justifying the crime by covering it with the pretence of modernity. He states that ethnic cleansing is most likely to happen where powerful representatives within two ethnic groups try to establish their rule over the same territory ‘in the name of the people’ (Mann, 2005, p. 33). However, the idea of modern and democratic rule in the people’s name has often been misused and too often demos has been read as ethnos, while the project of democratization has been treated as ethnic homogenization (Mann, 2005, p. 33). Thus, as Mann notices, mass scale ethnic cleansing has been viewed as the ‘dark side of democracy’, and in such circumstances, genocide has been taken as something more likely to happen under the conditions of imperfect democratization (2005, p. 33).

As such, Malesevic concludes that the 1915 genocide of Armenians was not executed by an authoritarian Ottoman Empire, but by a multiethnic Empire, where the ideological incentive was created by secular and Western oriented Young Turks. Moreover, the actions were carried out neither in the name of Allah, nor for the sake of imperial

Ottoman glory, but rather in the name of modernizing the ruling system and reviving the nation/state-building process (Malesevic, 2006, p. 208).

Therefore, genocide can be related to factors such as interstate rivalry, government expansion, modernization or nation/state creation, while patriotism and nationalism are factors providing ideological and emotional grounds for carrying out the crime.

For understanding what ideological mechanisms were used in case of the Armenian Genocide and how they actually worked, we would need to have a more profound study in this area for better illustration of how the blend of such notions like ethnicity and ideology was applied in the case of the Armenian Genocide.

Transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey: the Nation Building Process and the Fate of Ethnic Armenians in 1920s

During the nation-building process in the late 19th century, the urgency of forming collective identity appeared in Turkey in response to Western attempts to partition the Ottoman Empire, therefore the following question emerged - what collective character should unite the society for avoiding the collapse (Akcam, 2004, pp. 124-5)? As a response to this question, two main political movements emerged in the middle of the 19th century, one of which was 'progressive/reformers' and the other, 'reactionary/traditionalists'. Despite the differences between these two movements, the sides were united on one point – the need for creating some shared, homogenous elements which separated the 'us' from the 'them' (Akcam, 2004, p. 125).

As a result, The Union and Progress movement (CUP), which became a driving force in the political power in the Ottoman Empire of 1908, emerged as a movement aimed at creating a centralized and modern state where the fundamental condition of strong state building was the shared identity based on universal equality (Akcam, 2004, p. 125). While it was obvious that there was need to gather different religious-national groups of the Empire under one roof for creating this 'union of peoples', it was unclear what the shared moral values and cultural identity between the Empire's different communities should be, which would allow them to unite (Akcam, 2004, p. 126).

Eventually, a very classical approach in solving the problem of creating a shared identity imposed upon the modern state was applied, i.e. the principle of universal citizenship, which considered everyone as equal, combined with a cultural identity that could be

defined as Ottomanism and which would be formed around the values of the dominant Muslim Turkish society (Akcem, 2004, p. 128).

For this purpose, the unionists planned to implement the policy of assimilation or Turkification of the Ottoman Empire, which occurred in several ways. One such way was staying far from political and social pluralism as the CUP was convinced that only by transforming the country into an ethnically homogenous core state with an ethnically homogenous population was the only acceptable model for the Ottoman Empire (Ungor, 2011, p. 293). As a result, actions were carried out such as undertaking detailed ethnographic research on almost all the non-Turkish Ottoman peoples in order to facilitate the plans of ethnic 'restructuring' (Ungor, 2011, p. 293).

An extensive campaign of Turkification was launched in the summer of 1913, when the place names were changed in many parts of the country and all traces of non-Turkish cultures were wiped out; the process went as far as the 1960s and ended up in the alteration of tens of thousands of topographic names (Ungor, 2011, p. 296).

Another way was the deportation of the entire Armenian population from Anatolia, which occurred based on the order of compulsory deportation of all Armenians to Der Zor (desert in Syria). Any Muslim protecting an Armenian was to be hanged in front of his house, his house was to be burnt down and if such a Muslim held an office, he should have been removed from it and brought in front of the martial court (Ungor, 2011, p. 297). By the autumn of 1915, the Ottoman bureaucracy had depopulated most of the Armenian settlements, isolated or eliminated the Armenian community leaders, and was managing the expropriation and allocation of the remaining Armenian property to Muslims (Ungor, 2011, p. 298).

Aside from deportation, massacres were also taking place. One such massacre that took place in 1915 in Diyarbakir and was carried out by the governor of the town Resid Bey who, according to his own words, 'removed' 120,000 Armenians from his province, the majority of whom were massacred or died from exhaustion (Ungor, 2011, p. 137). The governor, taking the Social Darwinist idea of the need to kill collectively in order to survive collectively, justified the murders as follows:

Either they us, or we them. In this situation, I thought to myself: (...) either Armenians will liquidate the Turks, or the Turks will liquidate them! ... Faced with the necessity of having to choose I did not hesitate for long. (...) But I did not accomplish this deed either to satisfy my personal pride or to enrich myself. I had seen that the fatherland was about to be lost, therefore, I proceeded eyes

closed and without consideration, convinced that I was acting for the welfare of the nation (Ungor, 2011, p. 137).

Such actions, made by this and other governors, supported the realization of the plan of centralization, full sovereignty and Turkification of Anatolia at the expense of the region's religious and ethnic minorities. The First World War offered an opportunity to carry out these plans without attracting unnecessary attention.

However, not all governors were carrying out the order this eagerly. During the testimonies given before various sessions of the Unionists' trials in the courts-martial, former Ankara governor explained his removal thus: "I acted as if I did not understand the orders concerning the deportation of Armenians that I received from the interior minister in Istanbul. [...] [When] Atif Bey arrived... He orally relayed to me the order regarding the killing and annihilation of Armenians. I told him 'No, Atif Bey, I am the governor, I'm not a bandit. I cannot do it. I will get up from the [governor's] chair and you can come and do it.'" (Akcem, 2012, p. 195).

In addition to the provincial and district officials who lost their positions, other local officials lost their lives. Huseyin Nesimi, the senior administrator of Lice County, refused to carry out the order to massacre his Armenian residents. He first demanded to receive a written order to this effect. He was soon removed from his position, summoned to Diyarbakir, and murdered on the way. As his son recalls, the order to dismiss state officials came from Diyarbakir governor Dr. Resid Bey, and he names several other provincial and district heads who shared a similar fate. In order to carry out the annihilation of the Armenians, the younger Nesimi explains, "it was unavoidable that the administrative cadre that was likely to oppose [such a measure] would have to be removed. For this reason (...) it appeared necessary to eliminate the aforementioned persons" (Akcem, 2012, p. 196).

Armenians, however, were not the only ethnic group on the list. Kurds were also condemned to mass deportation. They were deported from East Anatolia to Western Anatolia and, according to the official correspondence, they were to undergo assimilation and rapid linguistic Turkification (Ungor, 2011, p. 298). The removal of Kurds from Eastern Turkey was accompanied by forced assimilation. In 1928, the Turkish nationalist Tekin Alp published a manifesto entitled 'Turkification', in which he argued that the rapid cultural homogenization of Turkey could only be accomplished by Turkifying the minorities by force: methods of forced integration included assuming

Turkish names, speaking only Turkish, extinguishing non-Turkish collective identities, and socializing with Turks (Ungor, 2011, p. 303).

As a result, in 1928, the Kemalist government initiated campaign titled “Citizen, Speak Turkish!”; in 1930, a secret order was issued regarding the fate of the deportees in that they were to be “made Turkish in languages, traditions and desires”; in 1934, the Surname Law homogenized all family names into a Turkish melting pot (Ungor, 2011, p. 303).

The significant component of Turkification was also making the use of Turkish language compulsory in all state organs and schools, as well as forcing the businesses owned or operated by non-Muslims using Turkish in all their corporate transactions. While the first step was aimed at cultural and linguistic homogenization, the second step aimed at establishing and enriching the ‘national economy’ through seizing the wealth of non-Muslims (Ungor, 2011, p. 296). Finally, removal of these events from people’s memory was also an important method of Turkification. For every region in Eastern Anatolia, local official historians produced volumes of history books, where the fact of the genocide was silenced and all ethnic minorities were named as Turks (Ungor, 2011, p. 304).

Through these steps, various ethnic and religious groups in the Ottoman Empire and then in the Turkish Republic were expelled and destroyed through the continuous processes of ethnic cleansing in the period of 1878 - 1945. The re-conceptualization of Turkish history in the first half of the twentieth century took place through deportation, expulsion and assimilation. First, there was the Armenian Genocide, then the expulsion of the Greeks, and finally the dissolution of the Kurds, which all led to homogenization of the society during the Young Turks’ (CUP) era. It was these Young Turks that were united around CUP’s ideological projects who shaped the policies of state/nation formation and the political and ethnic map of Turkey (Ungor, 2011, pp. 304-5).

Ideological Grounds

The fall of the Ottoman Empire gave birth to several ideologies aimed at preventing its total collapse: these were Ottomanism, Islamism, Westernism and Turkism. Despite the differences between them, the core of all of these ideologies was the expectation of continuing Turkish domination over other nations in the region (Akcam, 2004, p. 134). The uniting point among these different streams was not only the religious dominance of Muslims over non-Muslims, but also of the Turkish race over all other races. As such,

different representatives of these streams agreed that in regards to their military, civilizing and political roles, the Turkish race was superior and more ancient than all the other races, which in turn privileged them over other races (Akcam, 2004, p. 135).

What the CUP later on did was simply borrow this ideology, claiming that in multinational constructs such as the Ottoman Empire, the domination of one nation/ethnos should be seen as normal. However, the CUP did not entirely reject other ideologies such as Islamism or Ottomanism, but instead applied them whenever occasion demanded (Akcam, 2004, p. 137). In the series of articles “Turkification, Islamification, Modernization” published in 1913, Ziya Gokalp, an influential figure in the formation of Turkish nationalism, argued that these ideologies should be understood as essentially saying the same thing, thus forming the necessary theoretical foundation for the CUP’s pragmatism: “There has never been a contradiction between Turkism and Islam, because one possesses the character of nationalism, the other, of international unity (...) Turkism is simultaneously Islamism” (Akcam, 2004, p. 137).

When it was obvious that the idea of unity of different religious and ethnic groups was not possible, the attempts of establishing a new state on the foundation of Islam and Turkishness came to substitute previous ideology. For Gokalp, it was clear that a state that was not based on a shared consciousness could not survive, which eventually led to the creation of ideal nationhood and it was announced that nationalism had to be employed among Muslims (Akcam, 2004, p. 138). For achieving political unity, Gokalp suggested to follow a German model of ‘cultural unity, economic unity and political unity’, where economic unity could be achieved through common national consciousness. This, in turn, drew the focus on the ethnic dimension of the economy, because the national economy could be realized through ethnic uniformity: Accordingly, the idea was that there must be a division of labor based on one ethnic group, which has shared moral values (Akcam, 2004, p. 139).

As a result, the portrayal of non-Muslims as responsible for the disasters that had befallen the Empire started. The idea that the survival of Turkey was greatly depending on the decrease of the amount of ‘foreigners’ dominated in the society and oppression against non-Muslims became an everyday occurrence (Akcam, 2004, p. 140). Muslim-Turkish elements began to employ political force to remove non-Muslims from their economic position and to replace them, and through economic nationalization, non-Muslim subjects and foreigners were eliminated from the market. By implicating large numbers of people via illegal methods of acquisition, the Young Turk government bought the silence and cooperation of the populace as many enriched themselves by

misappropriating the forcibly abandoned properties and businesses of the Armenians (Adalian, 2009, p. 66). These measures allowed CUP to clear the markets from non-Muslims and also created lots of income flow for the party's own functionality (Akcamlar, 2004, p. 143). This step, among others aimed at exterminating non-Muslims in the region, eventually led to the creation of the identity the CUP had long strived for, which in turn gave firm grounds for the creation of the Republic of Turkey.

Conclusion

The Armenian Genocide, even though carried out during the First World War, was planned long before 1915. The ideology of transforming the multicultural, multiethnic and multi-religious communities in the region into a more homogenous society was planned the moment it was obvious that the Ottoman Empire needed to undergo structural changes for surviving the pressures from outside and within. The transformation of the country into a modernized and westernized state, which was the only way of survival according to the Young Turks, was viewed by them as possible only through the creation of a homogenous society and in turn, ethnic unity. As a result, ethnic cleansings in the region once again proved that the reasons for crimes against humanity and genocide do not result primarily from authoritarian traditions, politics or economic or technological backwardness, but from the idea of creating a modern nation-state, where ruling powers would have the unanimous support of a given population with shared cultural values, ethnic backgrounds and religious inclinations. As such, the creation of the Republic of Turkey is a clear example of how ethnicity and ideology, when intertwined and used as a tool for obtaining power, can and do lead to genocides.

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Is Bi-Polarity more stable than Multi-Polarity?

Eleftherios Eleftheriou

ABSTRACT

International relations theorists belonging to the neo-realist school of thought suggested the 'poles' systems as a way to understand the international system and the interaction between states. According to this theory, the international system is considered bi-polar when there are two dominant adversarial superpowers and multi-polar if there are numerous powerful states (or organisations) that share power.

The most significant example of a bi-polar system is the Cold War that dominated the international system for the second half of the twentieth century. Multi-polarity is much more frequent, as it was the prevalent system both before and after the Cold War. This paper compares the two periods in an effort to assess the relative stability of each and answer the question of which system allows for greater stability.

With scholars, politicians and theorists divided over this question, the paper presents both stable and unstable components of the two periods and after balancing those, it reaches the conclusion that despite its evident flaws and hazards, the Cold War was more stable compared to both the contemporary post-Cold War, but also the turbulent pre-World War II multi-polar systems and their associated threats.

Introduction: The power theory

The international system today is comprised of 195 independent states according to the US State Department (US Department of State, 2011). According to the realist theory, the rational self-interested state is the dominant actor in an anarchical international system and power is distributed across all states (Kauppi and Viotti, 2012, p. 52). Some realists consider power to be a sum of the military, economic, technological, diplomatic and other capabilities of the individual states. Others see the power of a state as a comparative value in order to compare between stronger and weaker states (Kauppi and Viotti, 2012, p. 52). In this view, power is an attribute attached to individual states indicating their relative rank in the international scene. Neo-realists, in an effort to understand the distribution of power among states, suggested the 'poles' theory (Kauppi and Viotti, 2012, p. 54). In this

theory, a 'pole' represents a major power, a state whose power exceeds, by far, the power of the other states. Balance of power was used to explain not only the distribution of a state's power but also the overall quest for hegemony (Haas, 1953). This theory suggests three possible outcomes: uni-polar (a system with a sole dominant superpower), bi-polar (a system with two great powers who are much stronger than the other states and who share approximately equal power between them) and multi-polar (a system with three or more major powers) (Kauppi and Viotti, 2012). The aim of this paper is to examine the nature of the international system today and assess the relative stability of multi-polarity and bi-polarity. I will assess the relative stability both in terms of conventional wars, but also in terms of nuclear weapons.

Bi-polarity and the Cold War

During the second World War, the Soviet Union (USSR) and the USA were both in the same coalition, formed to neutralize the threat of the Axis alliance of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Japan. After the end of the war though, the two former allies soon became deadly adversaries. It is suggested that it was the future of the defeated enemy states of Japan and Germany that offered the first source of friction between USSR and USA (Wagner, 1993, p. 80). In the case of Japan, a compromise was easier – Soviet troops never set foot on the Japanese islands. On the other hand, the future of Germany proved to be an intractable issue: the Soviet Red Army had reached Berlin and Soviet troops had managed to advance deep into German territory before the conclusion of hostilities (Wagner, 1993, p. 80). The situation was made worse by the Helsinki accords which allowed for an unstable status quo in Europe, as the continent was divided between the USA and the USSR (Wagner, 1993, p. 80). The result of this tension was a period of dangerous competition between the two powers called the 'Cold War'.

It is not hard to observe the bi-polarity of the Cold War. Both the USSR and the USA possessed immense power compared to the other states. In addition, the power they possessed was threatening the very existence of the planet or, as Oleg Bykov puts it, the whole world was 'hostage to the superpowers' (Bykov, 1994, p. 64). The superpowers possessed so much power between them, that they did not consider their ally states as a sufficient defence to counter a possible attack (Wagner, 1993, p. 81). Ideologically, the USSR was communist and the USA was capitalist and each created its sphere of control and influence in an effort to spread its ideology (Bykov, 1994, pp. 63-4). The USA was dominating West Europe, while Russia was controlling Eastern Europe including the Eastern part of Germany. But what effect did this dangerous relationship between two extremely powerful states have on the stability of the international system?

The Instability of the Cold War

The fact that, in hindsight, the Cold War remained a war of ideologies and was not transferred to the field of battle does not imply that the world was safe and stable during the years the Cold War lasted. The most dangerous element of the Cold War was the possession of nuclear weapons by the two superpowers. In previous conflicts, military leaders were always trying to devise superior tactics to annihilate the enemy's military forces with as few friendly losses as possible (Wagner, 1993, p. 82). However, as the US nuclear attacks on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have proven, nuclear weapons were unstoppable, indefensible and gave the nuclear state the option of immediate and complete destruction of an enemy state, without mobilising its troops or conventionally defeating the enemy in combat. The situation concerning Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) was made worse during the antagonistic arms race between the two giants (the USA and the USSR) and the development of second strike capabilities. This meant that if one of the two launched a nuclear missile, the other would retaliate by launching its own WMDs within minutes (Robertson-Snape and Spear, 2001). This led to a fear of thermonuclear mutual destruction (nuclear Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) became the official term to describe this danger) not only of the two superpowers but of the whole world, as there were clearly two ideologically divided hostile camps (Wagner, 1993, p. 81). One of the numerous crises of the Cold War (Kegley and Raymond, 1992), the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, is considered by many analysts the most serious of all and also the point where the future of humanity was hanging by a thread (Alkadari and Salmon, 1992, p. 122). The installation of Soviet nuclear missiles on the island of Cuba just off the US coast nearly triggered a thermonuclear war. Although the tension was accommodated (the missiles were removed in exchange for US concessions in Europe and Asia), the constant antagonism of the two created a security dilemma between them (Kegley and Raymond, 1992). The equilibrium of power between the two superpowers was constantly strained as both powers were seeking even a minor advantage over the other, proving Ernst Haas' theory that balance of power can be another way for states to gradually reach global hegemony (as both the USA and the USSR tried to overpower their adversary to become a hegemonic superpower) (Haas, 1954, p. 450). The bi-polarity of the system made the Cold War a zero-sum game (Kegley and Raymond, 1992, p. 576).

The USA and the USSR were joined on the nuclear states list by another three countries – Britain (October 1952), France (February 1960) and China (October 1964) (Robertson-Snape and Spear, 2001, p. 98). However, the two superpowers prevailed so clearly in military affairs due to the combined strength of their technologically superior WMDs and

their advanced conventional forces. An important fact is that throughout the full duration of the Cold War, no weapon system or type of munitions was ever outlawed as an 'inhumane weapon' (Robertson-Snape and Spear, 2001, p. 102). From the end of the First World War until 1925, two very famous 'inhumane weapons' were outlawed (the 'dumdum bullets' and nerve gas). In the 1990s, there was active campaigning to prevent the deployment of landmines and use of blinding laser-weaponry, but no attention was paid towards banning Cold War era inhumane weapons (Robertson-Snape and Spear, 2001, p. 102). Both superpowers produced such powerful and advanced conventional weapons that, with or without their nuclear arsenal, they were still much more powerful than any other state (Wagner, 1993, p. 83). Some of these technologically advanced weapons were distributed to allied states. An example of this is the case of Israel and Egypt who used the latest technology available to them by the superpowers to clash in a series of wars (1956, 1967 and 1973) (Mason, 1992, pp. 165-9). US and Soviet presence in weapon supply or even direct involvement was also occurring in internal conflicts, such as the conflicts in Korea, Vietnam and Cuba, where the outcome of the internal conflict would decide the political ideology and thus the alignment of that state in regard to the two superpowers (Robertson-Snape and Spear, 2001, p. 100). All the above show that the world was holding its breath, fearing a thermonuclear war would break out. In the next section, I will try to examine whether the Cold War also stabilized the international system, at least compared to the turbulent multi-polar system it succeeded.

The stability of the Cold War and the previous multi-polar systems

In approximately the same amount of time that two multi-polar systems created tension and led to the two World Wars, the bi-polar system of the Cold War created tension and fear but not a general war. The First World War came as a result of the division of the superpowers of the multi-polar system into two major camps and the fact that these powers were reluctant to abandon their allies and their interests. Similarly, it can be argued that the Second World War was also a result of an unstable multi-polar system in which it was not clear which states were willing to join in an alliance to check the growing power of Nazi Germany (Wagner, 1993, p. 81). Contrary to both of those multi-polar situations, the bi-polar Cold War was 'fought' by only two actors: the USA and the USSR. As I mentioned earlier, these two superpowers were much more powerful than any other state, ally or foe (Wagner, 1993, p. 89). They were powerful enough to ignore the demands of their allies and, instead, independently track their own foreign policy towards each other (Wagner, 1993, p. 81). Alliances were not tilting the balance significantly – even when France and China (both nuclear states and relatively strong allies) abandoned NATO and denounced the USSR respectively, the behaviour of the two superpowers was

not altered (Wagner, 1993, p. 81). In a similar way, the fact that the alliances were also separated by ideological differences offered no opportunity for a change of sides, which meant that both superpowers had almost perfect information of the other and of its allies (Wagner, 1993, p. 81). This meant that both camps knew about the plans of the other side and this, in turn, implied both sides had an awareness of the other side's 'red lines'. Almost perfect information and more or less consistent behaviour on the part of the USA and the USSR meant that they could avoid serious miscalculations, a usual cause of wars (Wagner, 1993, p. 90).

In the previous section, I mentioned that there were a number of crises that increased the friction between the superpowers even further. But crises are not a Cold War phenomenon. In a study on crises between 1929-1975 (a period divided between multi-polarity and bi-polarity) the findings were very interesting indeed: in a total of 292 crises, 67% of crises that occurred during the Cold War resulted in a reduction of the tension, while for the previous multi-polar system, the equivalent figure was just 34% (Kegley and Raymond, 1992). The rising tension in times of crises helped the superpowers to understand the other actor's tolerance (Wagner, 1993, p. 81). The most useful illustration of this is the behaviour of the superpowers following the Cuban missile crisis, which was arguably a turning point in the Cold War (Alkadari and Salmon, 1992, p. 122). The establishment of the 'Hot line' after the 1963 Geneva Agreement, alongside the two SALT talks and the nuclear missile agreements of 1971 and 1973, was a measure to accommodate some of the existing tension of the Cold War. The fear of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) led to a mutual deterrence theory, a sufficient theory to explain the fact that the Cold War did not erupt into a thermonuclear military stand-off between the USA and the USSR. However, there are some other parameters that perhaps prevented this. Christopher Coker (1994, p. 30) suggests an interesting theory – he suggests that, as the two centres of political and economic ideologies, each of the two superpowers was also certain about its final victory. Nuclear war would bring destruction to both but the tense, yet peaceful Cold War could produce a dominant power. Although the nuclear threat was a fact, neither side was willing to strike first, hence the attention both superpowers devoted to second strike capabilities and missile interception systems (Robertson-Snape and Spear, 2001).

According to these facts, despite the knowledge that the Cold War was a period where antagonism and tension were high, it seems that at least the bi-polarity of the international scene was more predictable and stable compared to the multi-polar nature of previous eras. There was at least relative transparency and less complexity compared to

the systems that dragged the world into two major wars (the World Wars). In the next section, I will explore the nature of the post-Cold War international system.

The nature of the international system today

The nature of the current international system is a matter of debate among analysts. Is the modern world uni-polar or is the USA just a power in a multi-polar system? In my opinion, the world today is multi-polar. In my effort to show the multi-polarity of today, I will start by providing evidence why the world today is not a uni-polar system dominated by the USA. After the collapse of the USSR, the USA was the remaining Cold War superpower. The US economy is the largest in the world but recent studies show other states gradually catching up. Similarly, its military might (both conventional and nuclear) is not enough to make it the sole superpower as many states now have the technological edge to upgrade their own armaments to the level of US built weapons (Mastny, 1994, p. 59). Since the end of the Cold War, even non-militarily strong states gained a greater share of world power, not only from the defeated USSR but also from a strained USA (Bykov, 1994, p. 65). This means that the end of the Cold War brought to an end the bi-polar nature of the international system, as this was gradually becoming multi-polar (Bykov, 1994, p. 65). Furthermore, as Ernst Haas (1953, p. 444) states, a uni-polar system is a system in which a single state can 'overawe all the rest with impunity' and the USA is not such a state today.

Analysts identify at least 3 more centres of concentrated global power, even though these 'poles' have not demonstrated this power so far. The first is Japan, whose evolved and stable economy has secured its prominent position in both the IMF and the World Bank (Waltz, 2000, pp. 33-4). Japan's defence budget is in the top three globally and in June 1994, the Japanese Prime Minister declared that Japan, a country surrounded by nuclear states (China, India, Pakistan, Russia) and rogue states (North Korea), has the full capabilities to develop and sustain nuclear weapons to add to its technologically advanced conventional combat equipment (Waltz, 2000, pp. 33-4). The second case is China, whose economy is modelled to double in a maximum of a decade (Waltz, 2000, p. 32). A nuclear state since the Cold War era (Robertson-Snape and Spear, 2001, p. 98), with five to seven DF-5 class missiles capable of delivering nuclear strikes even in extreme ranges, China is more feared in the regional and global scale for its 3 million Red Guards (Waltz, 2000, pp. 32-3). The third case is the European Union (EU) whose power, although only potential, cannot be ignored. The union of the 27 states (European Union, 2011) boasts leading global actors in industry, economy, weapon manufacturing as well as modern, well trained armies with proven high performance in combat. Also, Britain and France, both

leading members in the EU, form 2/5ths of the UN permanent membership and both are nuclear states from the Cold War period (Robertson-Snape, 2001, p. 98 and p. 105). A truly integrated EU clearly has both the military and economic potential to overcome even the USA itself (Bykov, 1994, p. 67).

The instability of the multi-polar international system today

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, many thought that nuclear war was no longer a threat (Robertson-Snape and Spear, 2001, p. 94) and money would be diverted to economic and social development schemes instead (Reader and Thomas, 2001, p. 87). The post-Cold War era created some immediate gains for the international community – the apartheid in South Africa was dissolved and peace negotiations resumed in Northern Ireland and the Middle East (Little, Smith and White, 2001, p. 3). But the bloody conflicts in Bosnia, Angola, Kosovo, Congo, Chechnya and elsewhere (Little, Smith and White, 2001, p. 3) resulted in a surge of ethnic division. It was a desperate and angry form of ethnic hatred in a highly unstable global system, with conflicts resulting in genocides and ethnic cleansing (Coker, 1994, p. 30). Ethnic and religious identification, an issue lying dormant during the Cold War, was woken up by the instability of the new system (Little, Smith and White, 2001, p. 7), as the remaining Cold War superpower USA failed to act as an international peacekeeper (Smith, 2001, p. 69). The EU reverted to its conservatism and failed to respond even to conflicts within the European continent like in the cases of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (Rosenau, 1994, p. 106).

However, there was a way to slowly restore order even in an unstable multi-polar system - by stopping the supply of weapons. Unfortunately, arms trade rapidly increased after the Cold War (Rosenau, 1994, p. 106). Just like any other rational choice in International Relations, weapon sales are a 'cost vs. benefit' decision, with the cost being possible security threats and the benefit being economic gain from selling weapons (Robertson-Snape and Spear, 2001, p. 93). With the emergence of over 20 new states created from the fragmentation of the Soviet Union (Webber, 2001, p. 16), conventional armaments were 'inherited' by these states (Robertson-Snape and Spear, 2001, p. 93). These Soviet weapons were then quickly sold to the highest bidders (Robertson-Snape and Spear, 2001, p. 93). Furthermore, private arms dealers prospered in these new states due to the corruption. Weapon sales were no longer based on rational or ideological grounds as suppliers looked solely on the economic side of the equation. An extreme example is perhaps the 1995 skirmishes between the Russians and the Chechen rebels, where the Russians suffered casualties from Russian made weapons sold to the Chechens by private Russian manufacturers (Robertson-Snape and Spear, 2001, p. 93). In a highly turbulent global

scene, weapon sales benefited even designated 'rogue states' like Indonesia or states that intended to use weapons against their civilians like Rwanda (Robertson-Snape and Spear, 2001). The fact that by the end of 1994, the USA alone was actively supplying weapons and military services to 26 countries involved in either external or internal conflicts is alarming (Robertson-Snape and Spear, 2001, p. 102). Although the supply of weapons in war torn regions is not the spark initiating conflict, the easy access intensified existing conflicts.

In the nuclear field, the threat to humanity was not lifted. In 1995, a malfunction in a Russian 'second strike' weapon system initiated a nuclear missile countdown interrupted only minutes before launch while the nuclear arsenal of the all five nuclear states was expanded (Robertson-Snape and Spear, 2001). This happened simultaneously with the increase in the number of nuclear states, as in 1998, India and Pakistan officially joined the five existing nuclear states after developing nuclear weapons capable of destroying each other (Robertson-Snape and Spear, 2001, p. 97). Meanwhile, four states including the rogue states of Iran and North Korea, as well as the battle hardened Israeli state are believed to be developing WMDs while another six states have confirmed their technological ability to produce nuclear warheads (Robertson-Snape and Spear, 2001, p. 98). Unlike the treaties signed during the Cold War that came into immediate effect, the treaties signed in the post-Cold War period failed to be ratified by all nuclear capable states (Robertson-Snape and Spear, 2001, p. 95-7). This reinforces the worries that ex-Soviet Union states may attempt to sell the nuclear knowledge they 'inherited' just the way they sold Soviet conventional weapons (Robertson-Snape and Spear, 2001, p. 97). The breaking of many Cold War alliances and the distrust between states in an unstable political scene led many states to push for nuclear weapon development (Robertson-Snape and Spear, 2001, p. 96).

Conclusion

Although the bi-polar Cold War invented the nuclear threat, I believe I have managed to illustrate that it was a more stable arrangement than the multi-polar systems existing at the beginning of the 20th Century. Alliances were kept constant, arms sales were conducted on ideological grounds and the two superpowers deterred each other while restraining their allies and preventing nuclear proliferation. In my opinion, the nuclear threat has not diminished. The two superpowers would probably refrain from using WMDs even in the face of a serious crisis, but today, with their spread, a minor malfunction or a stolen nuclear warhead can mean an immediate nuclear strike. Furthermore, the uncertainty and lack of transparency in today's world between states,

accompanied by the ability of terrorism to strike anywhere, at any time, create an instability that is asymmetrical to the stability of the bi-polar Cold War, where the superpowers knew exactly who the enemy was. In the modern post-Cold War world, many states or groups choose to defy both the remaining superpowers (the USA, the EU etc.) and also international organisations like the UN. This, in turn, creates a global uncertainty, as it seems that superpowers can no longer control states that have a tendency towards becoming more 'rogue'. Given these observations, I would say that bi-polar systems seem more stable than multi-polar systems and I would also add that the Cold War, although not completely safe, was in many ways more stable than today's multi-polar international system.

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What explains the rise of Minor Parties in British General Elections since 1997?

James Downes

ABSTRACT

This paper charts the rise of minor parties in British General Elections since 1997 at the ballot box. The first model states that issues such as environmentalism, immigration, and Europe have become more important in the calculus of voters and have given voters greater opportunities to vote for minor parties such as the Greens, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), and the British National Party (BNP) on Election Day. The second explanation focuses on structural changes in society and how the emergence of a more educated society has led to an increase in single-issue parties such as the Green Party. The second model outlines that a large part of minor party success is due to a protest thesis, where voters have shifted away from mainstream parties and voted for minor parties as a result. The paper argues that by shifting towards the centre-ground, the Conservative and Labour Party may have alienated their core voters to shift towards far-right parties such as the BNP and UKIP. The paper concludes by arguing that minor parties in Britain have had greater success at European and local elections, and that their rise in support has largely been hindered by institutional mechanisms such as the First-Past-The-Post system. The paper utilises examples from the federal system of Belgium where a proportional representation system is adopted and minor parties appear to have had greater representation under this type of electoral system.

“Third [Minor] parties are like bees: once they have stung, they die.”¹(Goodwin, 2011).

¹The original statement was first coined by Richard Hofstadter in 1959. The remark initially made by Hofstadter related to third Parties and the stinging effect in 1955. I have inserted the term ‘minor’ here to replicate Hofstadter’s original analysis of Third Parties.

Introduction

In the political science literature, the study of minor parties is a relatively new phenomenon. (Meguid, 2005; Birch, 2009; Goodwin et al., 2007). Since 1997, a number of minor parties have increased their vote share at the national level² (Webb, 2005). Independent candidates such as Dr Richard Taylor have experienced success, running for Parliament in 2001 and winning³ (Webb, 2005). The landmark for minor party success came at the 2010 General Election, where the Green Party gained its first Member of Parliament (MP) in the constituency of Brighton Pavilion (Walker, 2010). Parties such as UKIP and to a lesser extent, the BNP, also continued their rise at the national level in the 2010 General Election.⁴ This paper charts the rise of minor parties in British General Elections post-1997⁵ and the mechanisms responsible, from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. The first section of the paper defines the concept of the term ‘minor parties’ and outlines General Election data since 1997. I utilise two models from contemporary political science literature to explain the mechanisms for the rise in support: the Opportunities and Social Structure Model and the Protest Thesis Model.⁶ The second section includes a brief caveat, analysing the limitations to minor party success since 1997 at the national level.⁷

Section I

i. What defines a Minor Party in the United Kingdom?

Disagreements have arisen within the political science literature in defining minor parties. (Meguid, 2005; Copus et al., 2009). A myriad of labels have been used to define

²Data showing the increase in support for the minor parties will be outlined later on in the paper.

³Dr Richard Taylor was the Independent MP for Wyre Forest between 2001 and 2010 and lost his seat at the 2010 General Election.

⁴From now on, the United Kingdom Independence Party and the British National Party will be referred to as UKIP and the BNP respectively.

⁵The minor parties that I have chosen to include in this analysis are the British National Party, the United Kingdom Independence Party and the Green Party. The Respect Party will only feature intermittently in this essay. I will not include parties such as the United Kingdom Referendum Party, or parties that are dominant in Northern Ireland Politics such as Sinn Féin and the Democratic Unionist Party, as these parties either abstain from sitting in Westminster or are more predominant in the politics that shape Northern Ireland. Additionally, I will not explore the SNP in this paper as I do not deem this party to be a minor party, due to its electoral predominance in Scottish Politics.

⁶ This Model focuses on the perceived negativity or weakness of mainstream parties on behalf of the electorate. A general feeling of alienation is prevalent here. Minor parties such as the BNP and UKIP are the major beneficiaries from this Model.

⁷ This argument focuses on the effect of institutional factors such as electoral systems which can hinder and aid minor parties on the whole.

minor parties, ranging from ‘hinge’ parties, to labels such as ‘anti-system’, ‘pro-system’, ‘niche’ parties and ‘anti-establishment’ parties (Copus et al., 2009, p. 9). Sartori (1976) defines minor parties in terms of their blackmail capacity and of the way in which they can influence mainstream parties through their blackmail potential. The Copus et al. terminology defines minor parties as having a small electoral base that competes regularly at general and local elections. The Copus et al. definition is adopted instead of the Sartori model as it provides a more comprehensive definition overall, with the Sartori classification merely focusing on the blackmail capacity of minor parties. Furthermore, political parties such as the Green Party do not act in a blackmail capacity, thus limiting the scope of the Sartori model.

Minor parties in the United Kingdom tend to operate around different ideologies and have divergent spatial positions (Clarke et al. 2004). In terms of spatial location, minor parties have tended to compete spatially around a narrow electoral space. Parties such as the BNP and UKIP have predominantly acted as protest parties in capturing support (Goodwin et al., 2009). UKIP competes electorally towards the far-right of the ideological spectrum and has tended to appeal to disaffected Conservative supporters on policy areas such as the European Union (Abedi et al., 2009). On the whole, the BNP adopts a different spatial position. Similarly to UKIP, the BNP positions itself towards the right-wing of the spectrum on issues such as immigration, the European Union, law and order. However in contrast to UKIP, the BNP have adopted a left-wing view on the economy as the party seeks to nationalize core services and holds sceptical views towards privatization (Goodwin, 2007). Conversely, the Green Party traditionally adopts a moderate centre-left ideological position and their core policy issue is the environment (Birch, 2009).

ii. Minor Party General Election Data Post-1997:

Traditionally, minor parties have performed better in European and local level elections, with scholars arguing that voters vote for minor parties at these elections due to dissatisfaction with mainstream parties. Other explanations centre on the differing electoral system that is used to elect representatives from member states in European Parliament elections (Goodwin, 2007). Election data in the United Kingdom since 1997 shows empirically how parties’ vote shares have increased in Westminster elections. Table 1 shows the evolution of vote shares since 1997 for both the minor and mainstream parties in the United Kingdom. The table shows that support for mainstream parties at General Elections has decreased since 1997, with the Conservative and Labour Party

experiencing the sharpest decrease in support. In turn, minor parties such as the Greens, UKIP, and the BNP have increased their overall vote shares (Bastion, 2010).

1. The Green Party:

The Green Party gained 0.21% of the total vote at the 1997 General Election and marked a decline from the 1992 General Election when the party received 0.52% of the total vote. Since the 1997 General Election the Green Party has increased its share of the vote at every General Election apart from the 2010 General Election. Whilst the Green Party vote decreased from 1.04% in 2005 to 0.96% in 2010 (Electoral Reform Society, 2010; Kimber, 2012), the party received its first Green MP in Parliament with Dr. Caroline Lucas gaining the seat of Brighton Pavilion. This marked a breakthrough for the party (Birch, 2010).

2. UKIP:

The overall vote share for UKIP has increased since 1997. The party's vote share went from 0.34% in 1997 to 1.48% in 2001 (Kimber, 2012). The party received its highest overall share of the vote at the 2005 and 2010 General Elections. The party achieved 2.20% and 3.10% of the vote respectively in the 2005 and 2010 General Elections. Though the party received 920,000 votes at the 2010 General Election, UKIP were not able to capitalise on this and win a seat in the House of Commons (Electoral Reform Society, 2010). The inability of UKIP to win a seat at the 2010 General Election can largely be explained by the mechanics of the First-Past-The-Post electoral system which tends to penalise smaller parties and reduce the chances of these parties translating their vote shares into seats (Duverger, 1972).

3. The BNP:

Similar to UKIP, the BNP has failed to translate aggregate level increases to individual level increases in constituencies across the UK. From 1997 onwards, the British National Party has increased its share of the vote at every General Election. The percentage of votes for the party in 1997 was 0.1% and in 2002 had increased to 0.2%. The party has gained its highest levels of support in 2005 and 2010, where the party gained 0.7% and 1.9% of the overall vote respectively (United Kingdom General Election Results Database, 2010). Although the party increased its vote share to nearly 2% at the 2010 General

Election, the BNP failed to capture any seats in Westminster.⁸ Empirically speaking, minor parties have increased their vote share at Westminster elections, yet have failed to translate these vote shares into seats since 1997 and have tended to perform better at European Parliament and local level elections.

Table 1- Evolution of Vote Shares post-1997 at UK General Elections (Kimber, 2012)

General Election Year	Conservative	Labour	Liberal Democrat	Green	UKIP	BNP
1997	30.7%	43.2%	16.8%	0.3%	0.3%	0.1%
2001	31.7%	40.7%	18.3%	0.6%	1.5%	0.2%
2005	32.4%	35.2%	22.0%	0.9%	2.2%	0.7%
2010	36.1%	29.0%	23.0%	0.9%	3.1%	1.9%

iii. Two Divergent Models that explain the rise of Minor Parties post-1997.

Model I- Opportunities and Social Structure Model:

This Model is two-fold in its explanation of the success of minor parties' post-1997 at UK General Elections.

i. New Policy Avenues giving rise to greater voting opportunities:

This Model states that minor party success at UK General elections since 1997 can be attributed to new policy avenues, such as environmentalism, that have given younger middle class voters greater incentives to vote at General elections for credible moderate parties, such as the UK Green Party (Birch, 2009). According to scholars such as Birch (2009), the UK Green Party is perceived to be the most competent party in resolving environmental issues, thus drawing a range of middle class young voters to vote for the party. Nonetheless, the predominant rise of core issues such as immigration and unemployment in the policy making arena has facilitated the rise and relative success of both the UKIP and the BNP post-1997. These anti-political establishment parties have surfaced, providing voters with opportunities to vote for parties whose policies are solely dominated by issues of discontent (Goodwin, 2007). Empirical research conducted by YouGov indicates that a large extent of gains on behalf of both parties post-1997 were

⁸ Since the 2010 General Election, the BNP has faced competition from the English Defence League and the party has been marred by a series of internal disputes.

achieved by the party attracting supporters who generally adopt an anti-immigrant and anti-European stance (Goodwin et al., 2010).⁹

ii. The changing social structure of society:

The Model posits that the social structure of society in the UK has changed. Inglehart's (1990) post-materialist thesis emphasises that society is structured on a different basis in the post-globalized world, with western economies shifting increasingly from industrial manufacturing towards a service based economy (Hay, 1999). Greater emphasis was placed on education in empowering the individual in society (Berlin, 2004).¹⁰ The emergence of a more educated society and an embracing of the post-materialist agenda through a green economy may explain why liberal and arguably single-issue parties¹¹ such as the UK Green Party have made significant inroads at Westminster Elections (Birch, 2009). Issues such as environmentalism have arguably empowered younger voters, conceivably breaking down core socialization ties (Clarke et al., 2004) and giving greater opportunities to vote and influence the political system (Birch, 2009). Inglehart's thesis may also explain why parties such as the BNP and UKIP have gained support, as the effect of the post-materialist thesis may be that, paradoxically, embracing the globalized and economically interdependent world (Beitz, 1979) may have fostered the nationalistic and anti-European attitude of both the far-right parties and their voters.

Similarly, the Dunleavy (1980) thesis asserts that new sectoral cleavages have emerged that cut across traditional social class divides. With higher levels of unemployment and the decline of working class occupations under both the Thatcherite and New Labour governments, the BNP have fed on the discontent of the working classes (Jones, 2011). With unemployment highly concentrated in old mining towns and general discontent with New Labour's shift to the centre-right, the BNP support has won extensive political capital in areas which have high levels of relative deprivation (Goodwin et al., 2010). The BNP has also campaigned on the necessity to reverse the globalized economy of the UK, impose tariffs on foreign products and implement a nationalist based economy (Copsey,

⁹ See the YouGov 2009 European Parliament study.

¹⁰ This conforms to the positive conception of liberty. Both the negative and the positive conceptions of liberty were differentiated in Berlin's seminal work that focussed on the divergent two concepts of liberty. A core tenet of New Labour was the doctrine of equality of opportunity which replaced the former democratic socialist goal of the party, pertaining to equality of outcome.

¹¹ Parties such as the Green Party and, to a lesser extent, both the UKIP and the BNP, can be viewed as parties which have single-interests in terms of the policy sphere. For example, the UK Green Party espouse environmentalism and pursue shallow ecological policies, but parties such as the BNP and UKIP predominantly adopt policies focussed specifically on the issue of Immigration or Europe respectively.

2011). Factors such as these may explain the success of parties such as the BNP since 1997.

Model II- The Protest Thesis Model:

This model posits that minor parties have accrued increasing levels of electoral success due to a perceived negativity towards mainstream parties. Mainstream parties in the UK have failed “to aggregate and represent adequately the diverse range of views and interests that make up the political dynamic” (Copus et al., 2009).

i. The BNP:

If one observes the UK Labour Party and the general electoral fortunes of the BNP since 1997, protest voting and greater electoral volatility may have conceivably led to the increase in support for the BNP. However, there is no clear data that can empirically verify the causality of this claim. Blair’s premiership as Labour Prime Minister saw a shift in policies, with the revision of Clause IV which outlined the party’s historical commitment towards the nationalisation of public services. New Labour now espoused privatization policies and arguably the party shifted towards the spatial position of the centre-right (Odmalm, 2012). The Labour Party maximized its electoral position by conforming to the Downsian Model and seeking the median voter (Downs, 1957). The perceived notion amongst many working class voters was that New Labour had abandoned the working class, by embracing higher levels of immigration to the detriment of British workers (Goodwin et al., 2009). With higher levels of unemployment in manual industry and a perceived fear amongst working class voters that directly equated higher levels of unemployment with increased levels of immigration, it appears that the protest thesis holds.

Concurrently, Goodwin and Ford have shown an empirical relationship between former disaffected working class Labour voters voting for the BNP (Goodwin 2007). Linehan hypothesized a similar statistical model which purports that an increase of BNP support, not only at local, but also at national elections post-1997, can be attributed to protest voting by traditional former working class Labour voters (Linehan, 2005). The BNP has sought to distinguish itself outside the political sphere, as an anti-political establishment party, with its strong stance on immigration and a strong nationalistic state directly opposed to the UK Labour Party’s stance on these issues, and to a lesser extent, the UK Conservative Party (Abedi, 2009). Goodwin remarks on the “disaffected white working class” who feel betrayed by the ideological shift of the Labour Party and have thus

protested in an antipathetic manner, either directly or indirectly by voting for the BNP (Goodwin, 2011, p. 98).

ii. The UKIP:

The UKIP sees itself “as a challenger to the parties that make up the political establishment” (Abedi, 2009, p. 74). The notion that mainstream parties are perceived to be weak on policy issues such as immigration arguably leads to direct political capital for UKIP. Ideologically, UKIP is a Eurosceptic centre-right party, its support is drawn primarily from antipathetic right-wing Conservative party voters, who feel disaffected by the current policies of the Conservative hierarchy in relation to Europe and immigration (Goodwin et al. 2009). The Conservative Party’s policy on the Euro has arguably had a detrimental effect on their right-wing support base. The issue has become side-lined under Cameron’s period as party leader, with the party preferring to ignore the toxic issue of Europe, by advocating that any future decision on Europe would be decided through a referendum on the issue (Goodwin et al., 2009). UKIP provides an alternative for disaffected right-wing voters, with their tough stance on immigration and their hostility towards supranational institutions, therefore providing a basis for disaffected former Tory voters to join (Daniel, 2005). UKIP has operated as a blackmail party in the Sartori (1976) mould, by shifting the Conservatives towards the right, in order to counteract the threat posed by UKIP. Empirical research solidifies the protest thesis by showing that the majority of UKIP respondents’ attitudinal predictors are ideologically right-wing, and hold anti-European Union sentiments (Goodwin et al., 2009). The study found that many voters voted for UKIP due to the negative policies on Europe and immigration that the Conservative Party espoused, alongside a high level of tactical voting by UKIP supporters (Goodwin et al., 2010). This has led to engendering the strength of the protest thesis model in explaining Minor party success since 1997, both at Westminster, European, and local level elections.

iii. The Green Party:

Green Party success post-1997 at UK General Elections can, to an extent, be explained by protest voting. A large degree of Green Party success may have been due to New Labour’s centre-right shift according to Birch (2009). New Labour’s weak stance on environmentalism and inability to achieve core goals in environmental reforms may have played an integral role in the protest vote, with affluent middle class Labour voters voting for the Greens due to their policy competence on environmentalism. Conceivably, disaffected middle-class Liberal Democrats may directly protest against the Liberal

Democrats role in the Coalition at the next General Election (Birch, 2009). These voters may comprise discontented students who may voice their anger at fundamental former Liberal Democrat policies which have been jettisoned in Coalition, such as the increase in Tuition fees. A general perception is that the Liberal Democrat Party may have abandoned core principles of social liberalism, in favour of more classical liberal ideals, of a smaller state and less of an emphasis on pursuing a social reformist agenda (Carter, 2008). The Green Party may likely have been seen not merely as a protest vote by alienated Liberal Democrat voters, but as the most viable alternative party. To a lesser extent, minor parties like 'Respect' have achieved representation in Westminster through the election of Galloway, due to issues such as their strong stance on the Iraq War (Ingle, 2007). A general shift of Muslim voters occurred in Bethnal Green and Bow, with the latter virtually deserting the Labour Party in favour of the Respect Party and to a lesser extent, the Liberal Democrats (Quinn, 2005, p. 176). Therefore, the protest thesis explains that a large extent of support for Minor parties related broadly to voter disaffection, which had a detrimental effect on mainstream party support.

Section II: Limitations to minor party success post-1997: The dynamics of minor party support at the local level and the effect of institutional variables in hindering electoral support.

Both Models I and II explain a large degree of variance in the success of minor parties electorally since 1997 in the United Kingdom. Minor parties have gained increased levels of the vote share since 1997, both at national, local, and European level elections. Most significantly though, local and European elections are paramount in explaining the rise of minor party success post-1997 at a national level. In effect, local and European level elections have acted as a springboard for these parties, engendering higher levels of political capital at a national level, therefore boosting political and electoral credibility for these parties. Nonetheless, there are inherent limitations to their electoral success, with only the Green Party translating their vote share into pure electoral representation at Westminster. Firstly, if we compare the success of UK minor parties at General, European, and local elections, then clearly the performance of the majority of minor parties in the latter is far superior. What then explains minor party success at the local level? If we compare the party systems adopted by our West European counterparts, clearly, proportional representation based systems have had a direct impact in affecting the party system and subsequently empowering minor parties (Heywood et al., 2011). In consociational polities such as Belgium, minor parties commonly enter into Coalitions,

due to the fragmented nature of the party system¹² (Deschouwer, 2012, pp. 61-3). In the region of Flanders in Belgium, minor parties such as the Flemish Liberals and Democrats, the Green Party and Vlaams Belang have had varying levels of electoral success, more so than minor parties have done in the UK (Mudde, 2000).

The core difference of the minor parties in Flanders is that these minor parties have attained representation and seats in the Flemish Parliament (Hainsworth, 2000). A few studies on minor parties have focussed on institutional variables, such as how the electoral system impacts directly on their success (Norris, 2005). As noted earlier, a tendency of the First-Past-The-Post electoral system is that it disadvantages smaller parties, thus making it more difficult for vote shares to translate into seats at Parliament. Conversely, at European level elections, the BNP, UKIP, and the Greens have performed decidedly better (Clark, 2008). In the 2009 European Parliament Elections, the Green Party received 8.6% of the overall vote and the British National Party achieved 6.2%, considerably higher than what both parties achieved at Westminster elections. In terms of the minor parties, the biggest winners were the United Kingdom Independence Party who gained 16.5% of the vote with a total of 13 MEPs for the Party (BBC, 2009).

A large factor in the success of minor parties may be due to the proportional representation based electoral system that is used at European Parliament Elections (Curtice and Steed, 2001). Evidently, whilst minor parties have prospered since 1997 in the UK at General elections, the electoral system used hinders greater representation for these parties at the national legislature, with the above aforementioned parties performing markedly better at both second and third order elections (Goodwin et al., 2009).

Conclusion:

This essay has explored two different models that explain the mechanisms behind the rise of minor parties in UK General elections since 1997. Empirically, minor parties increased their respective vote shares at a national level. I believe both Models I and II explain the

¹² The political separations in Belgium are clearly defined in the Constitution. Belgium is a federal state in which the communities and regions exercise different powers. There are three main language communities in Belgium, namely the Flemish Community, the French Community, and the German Community. The three regions are the Flemish Region, The Brussels Capital Region, and the Walloon Regions. For the sake of clarity, the paper solely focuses on the Flemish legislature which creates laws for the Flemish Community and Flemish Region and works independently from the federal legislature and the legislature of the other Communities and Regions. For further information see:
http://www.belgium.be/en/about_belgium/government/federale_staat/structure/

success adequately.¹³ Greater opportunities have arisen in minor parties in the UK gaining more exposure and coverage, alongside the changed nature of the social structure in society, which has arguably increased their electoral strength post-1997. The Protest thesis engenders that a large extent of minor party success can be attributed to a negative trend towards mainstream parties, in terms of their policies and empirical data which validates the claim that partisan dealignment is increasing.¹⁴ This model explains that the BNP and UKIP have increased their vote shares by picking up disaffected traditional working class voters and discontented right-wing Conservative voters. Section II briefly addressed the limitations to minor party success in the UK at national level. Institutional factors such as the First-Past-The-Post system have had a detrimental effect on minor party gains at national level, with the dynamics of local level support normally higher.¹⁵ Though minor parties have performed significantly well post-1997, clouds inevitably loom ever more on the horizon for minor parties such as the BNP, with party funds dried up, corruption scandals, and leadership problems engulfing the party. The BNP may be supplanted in the future by resurgent and expanding organisations such as the National Front and English Defence League. Question marks remain whether UKIP can gain representation in Westminster and whether the Green Party can hold onto their only seat. Hofstadter's poignant remark about the stinging effect of minor parties resonates well in today's fragmented political climate in the United Kingdom with electoral volatility high on the horizon.¹⁶ Time will tell whether minor parties wax or wane electorally in the future of British politics.

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¹³ Nonetheless, if it is the case that the Protest thesis explains Minor Party success more than the opportunities and social structure model, then it is likely that future minor party inroads may rest on further protest voting, which could also act in a counter-productive manner for minor parties in the UK.

¹⁴ This is evident through an increase in support both locally and nationally for minor parties such as: the UKIP, BNP, the Green Party, and to a lesser extent, Respect.

¹⁵ These parties have a tendency to perform better electorally at both second and third order elections, rather than at the national level. Furthermore, the 2010 AV Referendum defeat will have been a bitter blow for Minor parties in the UK.

¹⁶ Recent events such as the 2011 London Riots encapsulate the negativity towards not only mainstream parties but, in general, towards the political establishment. Additionally, the 2009-10 expenses scandal may have led to increased levels of minor party support at the 2010 General Election.

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